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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiffs Glenda Johnson and Steven Lucier appeal an 
order of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania denying their motion to remand this 
action to Pennsylvania state court.  They contend that the 
District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over their 
claims because the parties do not have complete diversity of 
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citizenship.  We conclude that the District Court‟s assessment 
of citizenship was correct, and that none of the Defendants is 
a citizen of the same state as either Plaintiff.  Accordingly, we 
will affirm.   
      
I. Background
1
 
 
 Johnson, a Louisiana citizen, and Lucier, a 
Pennsylvania citizen (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), suffer from 
birth defects allegedly caused by their mothers‟ use of the 
drug thalidomide during pregnancy in the 1960s.
2
  
                                              
1
 The parties agreed to proceed on the jurisdictional 
record made in Brewer v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 774 F. 
Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Pa. 2011), a similar case against many of 
the same defendants, supplemented by additional documents 
and affidavits.   
2
 Thalidomide was developed in the 1950s, and from 
1957 to 1961 it was prescribed to treat a variety of conditions, 
including morning sickness during pregnancy.  Emma 
Wilkinson, Thalidomide Survivors To Get £20M, BBC News, 
Dec. 23, 2009, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8428838.stm (last visited on Feb. 
11, 2013).  It was taken off the market after being linked to 
widespread, serious birth defects, including malformed 
organs and shortened or nonexistent limbs.  Id.  In Europe, 
more than 10,000 children were born with birth defects linked 
to thalidomide before the drug was banned.  Carl Zimmer, 
Answers Begin to Emerge on How Thalidomide Caused 
Defects, New York Times, Mar. 15, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/science/16limb.html?ref
=science&pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last visited on Feb. 11, 
2013).  The drug was not FDA-approved during that period, 
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Defendants, described in more depth below, are drug 
companies (and their successors-in-interest) that developed, 
designed, manufactured, and distributed thalidomide.  
According to Plaintiffs, “newly-accessible evidence reveals” 
that Defendants were aware of the drug‟s risks even while 
marketing it to pregnant women, and that for the last 60 years 
they have been engaged in an elaborate cover-up to avoid 
liability for those actions.  (Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 8.)   
 
 Seeking redress for lifelong physical and emotional 
suffering, Plaintiffs filed this personal injury action against 
Defendants in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas on 
August 26, 2011.  Within thirty days, on September 14, 2011, 
Defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting 
diversity jurisdiction.   Plaintiffs then filed a motion to 
remand the action to state court, arguing that diversity 
jurisdiction is lacking and removal was improper because 
four of the Defendants – GlaxoSmithKline Holdings (“GSK 
Holdings”), GlaxoSmithKline LLC (“GSK LLC”), 
SmithKline Beecham Corporation (“SmithKline Beecham”), 
and Avantor Performance Materials (“Avantor”) – are 
Pennsylvania citizens, as is Plaintiff Steven Lucier.
3
  The 
                                                                                                     
and therefore its alleged effects were less widespread in the 
United States.  Id.; see also Anita Bernstein, Formed by 
Thalidomide: Mass Torts as a False Cure for Toxic Exposure, 
97 Colum. L. Rev. 2153, 2154 (1997).   
3
 There are three other defendants – Grunenthal 
U.S.A., Grunenthal GmbH, and Sanofi-Aventis U.S., Inc. – 
whose citizenship is uncontested.  Sanofi-Aventis and 
Grunenthal U.S.A. are citizens of both Delaware and New 
Jersey, and Grunenthal GmbH is a German citizen.   
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District Court disagreed and denied Plaintiffs‟ motion, but it 
certified that order for interlocutory review.
4
  Johnson v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 853 F. Supp. 2d 487, 498 (E.D. 
Pa. 2012).  Plaintiffs then requested permission to appeal, 
which we granted on May 22, 2012.  On appeal, Plaintiffs 
repeat their argument that the District Court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction because GSK LLC, GSK Holdings, 
SmithKline Beecham, and Avantor are all citizens of 
Pennsylvania.   
 
 GSK LLC is a large pharmaceutical company that is 
responsible for operating the U.S. division of 
GlaxoSmithKline plc, the British entity that is the “global 
head” of the GlaxoSmithKline group of companies.  
(Appellees‟ Br. at 6.)  It was formed on October 27, 2009, 
when its predecessor – SmithKline Beecham – was converted 
from a Pennsylvania corporation into a Delaware limited 
liability company (“LLC”).  More specifically, SmithKline 
Beecham underwent a two-step conversion, first becoming a 
Delaware corporation by filing a “certificate of conversion” 
with the Delaware Secretary of State, in accordance with 
Delaware Code Title 8, Section 265, and then converting into 
a Delaware LLC under Sections 18-201 and 18-214 of the 
Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, Del. Code Ann. tit. 
6, ch. 18.  The LLC was formed under Delaware law because 
it “permits a corporation to convert to an LLC without any 
break in the continuity of the legal entity.”  (Id. at 10.)   
                                              
4
 As discussed in more depth below, we have 
jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order when a district 
court certifies in writing that its order involves “a controlling 
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for 
difference of opinion.”  28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).   
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 The purpose of that conversion was to obtain the tax 
benefits of LLC status and thus facilitate the formation of a 
joint entity with Pfizer, Inc. called “ViiV Healthcare,” which 
was created to “develop critical treatments for HIV/AIDS at 
not-for-profit pricing.”  (Appellees‟ Br. at 9.)  According to 
Defendants, “[i]f [SmithKline Beecham] had remained a 
corporation, it would have incurred hundreds of millions of 
dollars in unnecessary tax liability for transferring its existing 
HIV/AIDS assets to the new entity – a „prohibitive‟ obstacle 
that would have prevented the venture from being financially 
viable.”  (Id.)  Following the conversion, SmithKline 
Beecham dissolved under Pennsylvania law, which allows 
dissolution “[w]henever a domestic business corporation has 
domesticated itself under the laws of another jurisdiction.”  
15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1980.  
 
 Despite that change in entity form and domicile, 
SmithKline Beecham was, at least operationally, largely 
unaffected by its conversion to GSK LLC.  The company‟s 
headquarters is still in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where it 
occupies 650,000 square feet of office space and employs 
1,800 people.  Its management is substantively intact.  
SmithKline Beecham‟s board of directors became GSK 
LLC‟s “board of managers,” and those managers operate 
from the same offices they did before, with three located in 
Philadelphia and a fourth in North Carolina.  The ownership 
structure of the business is also unchanged.  SmithKline 
Beecham‟s sole shareholder had been Defendant GSK 
Holdings, a Delaware corporation founded in 1999 that holds 
GlaxoSmithKline plc‟s investments in the United States.  
Following the conversion, GSK Holdings became GSK 
LLC‟s sole member.  Although the default rule under 
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Delaware law provides that “the management of a limited 
liability company shall be vested in its members,” Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 6, § 18-402, GSK LLC assigned that task to the 
board of managers, making it a “manager-managed,” rather 
than a “member-managed,” LLC.5  Therefore, both before 
and after the conversion, GSK Holdings acted solely as the 
owner, not as the operator, of the company.       
 
Because it is a holding company, rather than an 
operating company, GSK Holdings‟ own activities are quite 
limited, consisting mostly of approving the financial 
statements from its investments.
6
  It also decides whether to 
pay dividends, make new investments, and approve proposed 
restructurings.  GSK Holdings‟ three-member board of 
directors has the exclusive authority to control all of those 
activities, which it does through resolutions it adopts at 
quarterly and special board meetings.  For most of the time 
relevant to this lawsuit, that board consisted of Michael 
                                              
5
 That structure was established in accordance with 
Delaware law by GSK LLC‟s limited liability company 
agreement.  See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-402 (permitting 
an LLC agreement to vest management authority in a 
manager).  That agreement provided that “[t]he members of 
the Board of Directors of SmithKline Beecham Corporation 
shall continue as the initial manager of the company, 
following the conversion, without the need for further 
action.”  (App. at 681.) 
6
 At all times relevant to this lawsuit, those 
investments primarily included money market investments, 
intra-group accounts, and the ownership interest in GSK 
LLC.   
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Corrigan, a senior officer of GSK LLC based in Philadelphia, 
Julian Heslop, the chief financial officer of GlaxoSmithKline 
plc based in London, and Donald McLamb, a Wilmington-
based employee of Wilmington Trust Services (“Wilmington 
Trust”), a company that provides “corporate services to 
Delaware holding companies” (App. at 756).7  In his capacity 
as an employee of Wilmington Trust, McLamb also serves as 
a director or officer of 50 to 75 other companies.   
 
Since 2001, GSK Holdings‟ board meetings have been 
held in Wilmington, Delaware at the Wilmington Trust 
headquarters.
8
  They typically last 15 to 30 minutes, and, 
                                              
7
 Those three directors were in office when discovery 
was conducted in Brewer. See 774 F. Supp. 2d at 726.  Julian 
Heslop retired on March 31, 2011, and therefore was not a 
member of the board of directors at the time this case was 
removed.  Plaintiffs argue that we must therefore disregard 
his role in the corporation, but they have presented no 
evidence that GSK Holdings‟ corporate structure has changed 
in the wake of Heslop‟s retirement.  Moreover, they agreed to 
proceed on the record developed in Brewer, see supra note 1, 
and they themselves rely extensively on Heslop‟s deposition 
testimony.  Therefore, we assume that although Heslop 
himself may no longer be carrying out the functions of GSK 
Holdings‟ London-based director, his testimony is still 
indicative of the corporation‟s structure and activities.    
8
 From 1999 until 2001, the company‟s board meetings 
took place in Philadelphia, and that city was therefore listed 
in GSK Holdings‟ bylaws as the location of its headquarters 
and board meetings.  Although that location changed in 2001, 
the company failed to update those bylaws until recently, 
when this litigation brought the mistake to their attention.  
 11 
 
although McLamb always attends them in person, directors 
Corrigan and Heslop often participate telephonically from 
other offices.  The parties disagree about the extent of the 
actual decision-making that occurs at the meetings.  Plaintiffs 
argue that GSK Holdings conducted its substantive work in 
Philadelphia and London, and that the board meetings served 
merely to “ratify decisions made somewhere other than 
Delaware.”  (Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 32.)  Defendants, on 
the other hand, insist that GSK Holdings‟ directors “reached 
decisions about GSK Holdings‟[] investments only at board 
meetings and based on their own independent judgment” 
(Appellees‟ Br. at 21), and that the board had exclusive 
“direction, control, and coordination” of GSK Holdings‟ 
activities (id. at 40). 
 
 Apart from those meetings, GSK Holdings‟ presence 
in Wilmington is minimal.  It subleases a small, ten-by-ten 
foot office from Wilmington Trust, but that office is rarely 
visited, and it serves primarily to house GSK Holdings‟ books 
and records.  GSK Holdings‟ other Wilmington activities 
consist mostly of administrative and secretarial functions, 
such as paying monthly bills for the office.  Those functions 
are usually conducted by Elizabeth Bothner, GSK Holdings‟ 
sole employee, who devotes about 20 hours per year to the 
company. GSK Holdings has one Delaware bank account 
that, as of November 2010, had less than $25 in it.   
 
 Although GSK Holdings‟ board has the sole authority 
to manage the company‟s activities, it receives various 
support services from individuals in both Philadelphia and 
London.  Officers Jan Lyons and Sarah-Jane Chilver-Stainer,
9
 
                                              
9
 GSK Holdings has six corporate officers.  In addition 
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who are based in Philadelphia and London, respectively, 
provide tax assistance and facilitate GSK Holdings‟ 
investment transactions, as does Philadelphia-based GSK 
LLC employee Audrey Klijian.  Complex tax issues are 
sometimes addressed by Helen Jones, a London-based GSK 
employee.  George Brown, another GSK employee based in 
London, maintains GSK Holdings‟ financial records, and 
overall strategic guidance comes from the London office.  
The GSK Holdings board has also authorized a number of 
people in both Philadelphia and London to sign documents on 
GSK Holdings‟ behalf and enter into certain routine 
transactions for the company.  Finally, directors Corrigan and 
Heslop generally prepare for board meetings at their 
respective offices, and staff at the Philadelphia office compile 
and circulate the materials that the board reviews during those 
meetings. 
 
 Beyond those limited functions, GSK Holdings has no 
operations.  It produces no products, conducts no research, 
and has no sales.  Rather, as is typical for a holding company, 
its role is confined to owning its interest in its subsidiary – 
GSK LLC.  See Black‟s Law Dictionary 298 (8th ed. 2004) 
(defining a holding company as a “company formed to 
control other companies, [usually] confining its role to 
owning stock and supervising management”); 19 William 
Meade Fletcher et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of 
Corporations, glossary at 13 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2006) 
(defining a holding company as “a corporation whose 
principal business is the holding of stocks of other 
                                                                                                     
to Lyons and Chilver-Stainer, Holdings‟ three directors serve 
as officers, as does Elizabeth Bothner, the company‟s 
Wilmington-based part-time employee.  
 13 
 
corporations”).  That subsidiary, on the other hand, has 
widespread and complex operations, as it develops, produces, 
and sells pharmaceutical products nationwide.  Such a 
corporate structure, in which an operating company is wholly 
owned by a holding company, has many features that are 
appealing to large business enterprises.  For example, the 
holding company structure gives each subsidiary the 
autonomy to manage its business without regard to other 
business units, it allows the enterprise to prevent liabilities 
incurred by one investment from jeopardizing other 
investments, and it facilitates borrowing transactions and 
restructurings.  See Robert Charles Clark, The Regulation of 
Financial Holding Companies, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 789, 816-
825 (1979) (describing the benefits of holding company 
formation).  Director Heslop testified that, for those reasons, 
including a holding company within an enterprise‟s corporate 
structure “is a very, very common thing.” (App. at 705.) 
 
 The last defendant – Avantor Performance Materials – 
is a New Jersey corporation that is not part of the 
GlaxoSmithKline group of companies.  Until 2011, it had its 
principal place of business in New Jersey.  In February 2011, 
Avantor announced that it was relocating its headquarters to 
Center Valley, Pennsylvania. The corporation officially 
moved its rank-and-file employees to its new headquarters on 
September 19, 2011, five days after Defendants removed this 
action.  The parties disagree on precisely when Avantor‟s 
high-level officers began directing activities from 
Pennsylvania.  Plaintiffs note that Avantor‟s website, a 
corporate directory, and many technical documents and 
federal filings listed its address in Center Valley starting 
before this action was removed.  They also observe that 
Avantor‟s CEO gave an interview from the new headquarters 
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two days before the official move date.  Defendants argue that 
those actions were all part of the preparation for the move, 
which multiple affidavits, an internal company memo, and a 
news story demonstrate occurred on September 19.   
 
 The District Court reviewed all of the foregoing 
evidence and concluded none of the Defendants was a 
Pennsylvania citizen at the time of removal.  It thus held that 
diversity jurisdiction is present.  Johnson, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 
489, 498.  Specifically, the Court found that GSK Holdings 
has its principal place of business in Wilmington, Delaware, 
where its board of directors manages its investments.  Id. at 
495.  It is therefore a Delaware citizen, as is GSK LLC, 
which, as a limited liability company, assumes the citizenship 
of its owner.  Id. at 491. As for the remaining Defendants, the 
Court held that Avantor was still a New Jersey citizen when 
the case was removed, id. at 495, and that SmithKline 
Beecham‟s citizenship is irrelevant because, as a dissolved 
corporation whose assets and liabilities have been assumed by 
another entity, it is a nominal party with no interest in the 
litigation, id. at 496-97.  Accordingly, the Court concluded it 
had jurisdiction over the case, and denied Plaintiffs‟ motion 
to remand.  Id. at 498.  This timely appeal followed.   
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court determined that it had jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  In denying remand, it certified 
for interlocutory review the jurisdictional question of whether 
two of the Defendants – GSK Holdings and GSK LLC 
(collectively, the “GSK Defendants”) – are Pennsylvania 
citizens, in order to resolve the uncertainty created by 
“contrary determinations as to the GlaxoSmithKline 
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Defendants‟ citizenship” that have emerged recently.  Id. at 
490.  To date, six judges from the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania have ruled on the issue of the GSK Defendants‟ 
citizenship.  Four of them concluded that GSK Holdings and 
GSK LLC are Pennsylvania citizens, and thus granted 
motions for remand due to lack of diversity.  See Brewer v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 774 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Pa. 
2011) (Savage, J.); Yeatts v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 
11-6711, 2012 WL 5488907 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2012) 
(Slomsky, J.); Murray v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 11-
3510, 2012 WL 5488905 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2012) (Jones, J.); 
Monroe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 10-2140, 2010 
WL 2606682 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 2010) (Joyner, J.).  Two 
others, including the District Judge in this case, reached the 
opposite conclusion.  See Johnson, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 489 
(Diamond, J.); White v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 10-
2141, 2010 WL 3119926 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2010) 
(McLaughlin, J.).  Due to that disagreement, and to the 
likelihood that it will continue absent our decision, the 
District Court certified the issue of the GSK Defendants‟ 
citizenship as “a controlling question of law as to which there 
is substantial ground for difference of opinion.”  Johnson, 853 
F. Supp. 2d at 490 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
 
We therefore have jurisdiction to review the Court‟s 
order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),
10
 which we accepted 
by granting Plaintiffs‟ request for permission to appeal.  
Although the District Court noted only the issue of the GSK 
                                              
10
 Our references to the District Court are, unless 
otherwise noted, to the Court acting through the Honorable 
Paul S. Diamond in this case. 
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Defendants‟ citizenship as requiring interlocutory review, we 
have jurisdiction to “address any issue fairly included within 
the certified order.”  Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 
516 U.S. 199, 205 (1996).  The certified order from which 
this appeal originated denied all Plaintiffs‟ bases for remand, 
including the alleged Pennsylvania citizenship of SmithKline 
Beecham and Avantor.  We therefore have jurisdiction to 
review the District Court‟s citizenship determination for each 
of the challenged Defendants, not just for GSK Holdings and 
GSK LLC.  See id. (noting that “it is the order that is 
appealable, and not the controlling question identified by the 
district court” (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in 
original)); cf. Morris v. Hoffa, 361 F.3d 177, 196 (3d Cir. 
2004) (“Although the scope of review on an interlocutory 
appeal is generally constrained to the questions certified for 
review by the district court, we may consider any grounds 
justifying reversal.” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(emphasis in original)). 
 
We exercise plenary review over issues of jurisdiction.  
Grand Union Supermarkets of the V.I., Inc. v. H.E. Lockhart 
Mgmt., Inc. 316 F.3d 408, 410 (3d Cir. 2003).  Under that 
standard, we review determinations of law de novo, but a 
court‟s factual findings regarding domicile or citizenship are 
reviewed for clear error.  McCann v. Newman Irrevocable 
Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006).  When reviewing for 
clear error, an appellate court “must accept the trial court‟s 
findings” unless it is “left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  Inwood 
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Frett-Smith v. 
Vanterpool, 511 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 2008) (applying that 
standard to the factual findings which underpin a court‟s 
 17 
 
determination of diversity jurisdiction).  Put another way, 
“[i]f the district court‟s account of the evidence is plausible in 
light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals 
may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been 
sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence 
differently.”  Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 
564, 573-74 (1985).    
 
 Plaintiffs argue that it would be unfair to apply the 
clearly erroneous standard to the factual findings in this case 
because of the contrary outcomes reached by different district 
judges on this jurisdictional issue.  But varying outcomes do 
not change that we are called upon to review only the 
particular order on appeal, nor do they put us in a better 
position to make our own factual findings.  See Inwood Labs., 
456 U.S. at 855 (recognizing the “unique opportunity 
afforded the trial court judge to evaluate the credibility of 
witnesses and to weigh the evidence”).  Rule 52(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes clear that “[f]indings 
of fact … must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court‟s 
opportunity to judge the witnesses‟ credibility.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 52(a)(6).  The Supreme Court has held that that standard 
applies “even when the district court‟s findings do not rest on 
credibility determinations, but are based instead on physical 
or documentary evidence or inferences from other facts.”  
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574.  We are therefore not at liberty to 
substitute our own jurisdictional facts for those credited by 
the District Court, unless that Court‟s findings are clearly 
erroneous.  We reiterate, however, that our overall review is 
plenary, and thus we do not defer to the District Court‟s 
application of the law to those facts.    
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III. Discussion 
 
 A civil action brought in state court may be removed 
by the defendant to federal district court if the federal court 
would have had original jurisdiction over the claim.  28 
U.S.C. § 1441(a).  “Diversity of citizenship subject matter 
jurisdiction falls within the original jurisdiction of the district 
court,” pursuant to § 1332(a) of Title 28 of the United States 
Code, and thus “a state court case that implicates diversity 
jurisdiction” may generally be removed, Brown v. Francis, 75 
F.3d 860, 865 (3d Cir. 1996), provided that the defendant is 
not a citizen of the state in which the action is brought, 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).  See also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (granting 
jurisdiction in cases between citizens of different states in 
which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000).  
Jurisdiction under § 1332(a) requires “complete diversity,” 
meaning that “no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as 
any of the defendants.”  Grand Union Supermarkets, 316 
F.3d at 410.  Diversity of citizenship must have existed at the 
time the complaint was filed, id., and at the time of removal, 
Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 
1985), and the burden is on the removing party to establish 
federal jurisdiction, id.  “Because lack of jurisdiction would 
make any decree in the case void and the continuation of the 
litigation in federal court futile, the removal statute should be 
strictly construed and all doubts resolved in favor of remand.”  
Brown, 75 F.3d at 864-65 (quoting Abels, 770 F.2d at 29) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).          
 
 Plaintiffs argue that removal of their case was 
improper because the federal courts lack subject matter 
jurisdiction over it.  They contend that each of the four 
Defendants involved in this appeal is a Pennsylvania citizen, 
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and thus that diversity jurisdiction is lacking because Plaintiff 
Steven Lucier is also a citizen of that state.
11
   Specifically, 
they maintain that GSK Holdings‟ principal place of business 
is in Philadelphia, and, because a limited liability company‟s 
citizenship is determined by the citizenship of its members, 
both GSK Holdings and GSK LLC are therefore 
Pennsylvania citizens.  Plaintiffs further argue that although 
SmithKline Beecham dissolved, Pennsylvania law preserves 
its citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.  As for 
Avantor, it became a Pennsylvania citizen when it moved its 
headquarters to Center Valley, Pennsylvania, which Plaintiffs 
claim may have happened before the case was removed.
12
  
We address each of those arguments in turn and conclude, as 
the District Court did, that none of the Defendants was a 
Pennsylvania citizen at the time of removal.   
   
                                              
11
 For the same reason, they also contend that removal 
of the case violated the rule barring removal when any 
“defendant is a citizen of the forum state.”  Lincoln Property 
Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 84 (2005); see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441(b)(2).  Plaintiffs do not dispute that the amount in 
controversy exceeds $75,000, as required by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a). 
12
 Plaintiffs do not specify when Avantor moved its 
headquarters to Pennsylvania.  Rather, they contend that 
“Avantor has not met its burden of proving that its principal 
place of business was in New Jersey, not Pennsylvania, when 
Defendants removed this action on September 14, 2011.” 
(Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 47.)    
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 A. Citizenship of the GSK Defendants 
 
 Section 1332(a) grants federal courts jurisdiction over 
civil actions between “citizens of different [s]tates,” 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), and it is well established that a 
corporation is considered a “citizen” for purposes of that 
provision, Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 189 
(1990).  Since 1844, the Supreme Court has recognized that a 
corporation is “capable of being treated as a citizen … as 
much as a natural person.”  Louisville, Cincinnati & 
Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497, 558 (1844).  It 
has taken considerably longer, however, for Congress and the 
Court to decide how a corporation‟s citizenship should be 
determined.  In 1958, after years of studying the matter, 
Congress amended § 1332 to provide that a corporation is a 
citizen of both its state of incorporation and the state “where 
it has its principal place of business.”  28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); 
see also Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 
1189-90 (2010) (describing the legislative history of that 
enactment).  But applying the phrase “„principal place of 
business‟ … proved more difficult … than its originators 
likely expected,” Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1190, and that difficulty 
resulted in “divergent and increasingly complex 
interpretations” by the courts of appeals, id. at 1192.  In 2010, 
the Supreme Court stepped in to resolve the confusion, 
holding in Hertz that “the phrase „principal place of business‟ 
refers to the place where the corporation‟s high level officers 
direct, control, and coordinate the corporation‟s activities,” 
which is often “metaphorically called its „nerve center.‟”  Id. 
at 1186.   
 
 In endorsing the “nerve center” test, the Court 
“place[d] primary weight upon the need for judicial 
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administration of a jurisdictional statute to remain as simple 
as possible,” id., and it rejected other approaches involving 
complex multifactor tests designed to pinpoint a corporation‟s 
“center of gravity,” id. at 1191.  Instead, it adopted the 
comparatively simpler method of identifying the single place 
that is the corporation‟s “brain” – its “actual center of 
direction, control, and coordination” – which is usually its 
headquarters.  Id. at 1192-93; see also id. at 1193 (“A 
corporation‟s „nerve center,‟ usually its main headquarters, is 
a single place.”).  Hertz also warned courts to guard against 
jurisdictional manipulation by ensuring that a corporation‟s 
headquarters is actually its center of direction, “not simply an 
office where the corporation holds its board meetings,” id. at 
1192, or “a bare office with a computer,” id. at 1195.  If there 
is evidence of such manipulation, Hertz explained that courts 
should look past that manipulation, and “take as the „nerve 
center‟ the place of actual direction, control, and 
coordination, in the absence of such manipulation.”  Id.  
 
 Hertz said nothing, however, about how to determine 
the citizenship of an unincorporated entity.  Such entities do 
not have the same legal status as a corporation, and the 
Supreme Court has made clear that, “[w]hile the rule 
regarding the treatment of corporations as „citizens‟ has 
become firmly established,” that treatment cannot be 
extended to other entities.  Carden, 494 U.S. at 189; see also 
id. (“That rule must not be extended.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  In Carden v. Arkoma, the Court held that, 
because unincorporated entities are not considered “citizens” 
in their own right, “diversity jurisdiction in a suit by or 
against [an unincorporated] entity depends on the citizenship 
of … each of its members.”  Id. at 195-96 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  In other words, because 
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such an entity is not recognized as a legal person, courts 
should look to the citizenship of the people or corporations 
who comprise it to determine if diversity jurisdiction exists.  
The principal place of business of an unincorporated entity is 
therefore irrelevant to determining its citizenship.  
 
 That rule holds true despite the substantive similarities 
between corporations and other entities.  Id. at 196.  The 
Court in Carden acknowledged that unincorporated entities 
can be “functionally similar” to corporations, and that 
“[c]onsiderations of basic fairness and substance over form” 
may “require that [they] receive similar treatment.”  Id. (first 
alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Yet 
it nonetheless enforced the rigid jurisdictional distinction 
between corporations and other entities.  See id.; see also 
Hoagland ex rel. Midwest Transit, Inc. v. Sandberg, Phoenix 
& Von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737, 739-40 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that a nonbusiness corporation, even though it may 
differ from business corporations in more respects than 
unincorporated entities do, is nonetheless treated as a citizen 
for diversity jurisdiction purposes).  Such adherence to 
mechanical rules may seem at first glance to be unfair, but it 
comports with the Court‟s unwavering insistence that 
jurisdictional rules “remain as simple as possible.”  Hertz, 
130 S. Ct. at 1186; see also Carden, 494 U.S. at 196 (“The 
resolutions we have reached above can validly be 
characterized as technical, precedent-bound, and 
unresponsive to policy considerations raised by the changing 
realities of business organization.  But, … that has been the 
character of our jurisprudence in this field … .”).  As the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
explained: 
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Functional approaches to legal questions are 
often, perhaps generally, preferable to 
mechanical rules; but the preference is reversed 
when it comes to jurisdiction.  When it is 
uncertain whether a case is within the 
jurisdiction of a particular court system, not 
only are the cost and complexity of litigation 
increased by the necessity of conducting an 
inquiry that will dispel the uncertainty but the 
parties will often find themselves having to start 
their litigation over from the beginning, perhaps 
after it has gone all the way through to 
judgment. 
 
Hoagland, 385 F.3d at 739-40.  For that reason, although the 
rise of new business structures may make the rigid divide 
between corporations and other entities appear outdated, the 
Supreme Court has explicitly left to Congress the task of 
“accommodating our diversity jurisdiction to the changing 
realities of commercial organization,” if it sees fit to do so.  
Carden, 494 U.S. at 197.             
 
 In recognition of those principles, this and every other 
Circuit Court to face the question have held that the 
citizenship of a limited liability company “is determined by 
the citizenship of each of its members.”  Zambelli Fireworks 
Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2010); see also 
id. at 420 (collecting cases from our sister circuits).  In 
Zambelli, we noted that limited liability companies “resemble 
corporations in many respects,” but we recognized that the 
Supreme Court has “flatly rejected arguments in favor of 
extending the rule of corporate citizenship to analogously 
formed business entities.”  Id. at 419 (citing Carden, 494 U.S. 
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at 189).  Therefore, we opted to treat limited liability 
companies as we do partnerships and other “unincorporated 
associations,” and held that courts must look to the 
citizenship of a limited liability company‟s members to 
determine if there is diversity jurisdiction.  Id. at 420.   
 
 Both sides in the dispute before us now agree that, 
under Zambelli, GSK LLC‟s citizenship is defined by that of 
its sole member: GSK Holdings.  As a corporation, GSK 
Holdings is a citizen of its state of incorporation and of the 
state where it has its principal place of business, 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(c)(1), which Hertz defined as its “nerve center.”  130 S. 
Ct. at 1186.  It is undisputed that GSK Holdings is 
incorporated in Delaware, so it is clearly a Delaware citizen.  
Therefore, in order for GSK Holdings – and, by extension, 
GSK LLC – to also be Pennsylvania citizens, as Plaintiffs 
claim, GSK Holdings‟ “actual center of direction, control, and 
coordination,” i.e., its nerve center, id. at 1192, must be 
located in Pennsylvania.   
 
 Plaintiffs provide two explanations for why they 
believe GSK Holdings‟ nerve center is in Pennsylvania, both 
of which were endorsed in a trilogy of opinions from the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  See Patton ex rel. Daniels-
Patton v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2011 WL 6210724, at 
*5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2011); Maldonado ex rel. Maldonado v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 841 F. Supp. 2d 890, 897 (E.D. 
Pa. 2011); Brewer, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 729-30, 732.
13
  First, 
                                              
13
 Those opinions were authored by the Honorable 
Timothy J. Savage.  Brewer, as Judge Savage‟s first statement 
on the matter, provides the core of his analysis. See 774 F. 
Supp. 2d at 729-32.  Maldonado supplemented and clarified 
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they argue that we should consider GSK LLC‟s activities in 
the determination of GSK Holdings‟ citizenship, because, as 
Plaintiffs put it, GSK Holdings had the authority to manage 
GSK LLC, but “delegated” that power to GSK LLC‟s 
managers.  (Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 25.)  Under that 
“delegation theory,” GSK Holdings‟ nerve center is in 
Philadelphia, because that is where GSK LLC‟s managers are 
based.  Second, they maintain that, even if we do not consider 
GSK LLC‟s management, “Holdings‟ own holding-company 
activities” are directed from Philadelphia, and thus that is its 
principal place of business.  (Id. at 27.)  We are unpersuaded 
by either of those arguments.     
 
  1. The Delegation Theory 
 
 Plaintiffs‟ novel delegation theory makes GSK LLC‟s 
management the focus in assessing GSK Holdings‟ nerve 
center.  Noting that the default rule under Delaware law is 
that “the management of a limited liability company shall be 
vested in its members,” Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-402, 
Plaintiffs conclude, as the court did in Brewer, that “[GSK] 
Holdings had the exclusive right and power to control, direct, 
run, manage, and operate [GSK] LLC.”  774 F. Supp. 2d at 
729.  According to Plaintiffs, GSK Holdings opted not to 
retain that power, instead “delegat[ing] that duty to 
Philadelphia-based managers.”  (Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 
26 (citing Brewer, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 729 (explaining that 
GSK Holdings had delegated “the operational decision-
making authority and power of [GSK] LLC to [GSK] LLC‟s 
                                                                                                     
aspects of the Brewer holding.  See 841 F. Supp. 2d at 894-
97.  Patton repeats Maldonado‟s analysis.  2011 WL 
6210724, at *5. 
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officers and directors”)).)  Looking at that delegation, the 
court in Brewer concluded that “[t]he „managers‟ of [GSK] 
LLC are still part of [GSK] Holdings because they are 
managing [GSK] LLC on behalf of [GSK] Holdings.”  
Brewer, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 729 (emphasis in original).  Based 
on that premise, Plaintiffs argue that GSK LLC‟s 
Philadelphia-based management decisions should be 
considered “„corporate activities‟ for which GSK Holdings 
was responsible.”  (Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 26.)  Those 
corporate activities far outweigh GSK Holdings‟ other limited 
holding-company functions, and thus, say Plaintiffs, its 
principal place of business is in Philadelphia.  As Brewer put 
it, because “[GSK] Holdings has effectively transplanted the 
vast majority of its „brain‟ or „nerve center‟ to its managers in 
Philadelphia,” it must be considered a Pennsylvania citizen.  
774 F. Supp. 2d at 730. 
     
 At the outset, it is important to note that the record 
does not support that description of GSK Holdings‟ 
relationship to GSK LLC.  To say that GSK Holdings 
“transplanted … its „brain‟ or „nerve center‟” to GSK LLC‟s 
managers implies that at some point GSK Holdings‟ activities 
included directing and controlling GSK LLC.  But GSK 
Holdings has never occupied such a role.  It has always 
functioned solely as the owner of GSK LLC, just as it did 
when it was the sole shareholder of GSK LLC‟s predecessor, 
SmithKline Beecham.  The only decision by GSK Holdings 
that arguably has affected GSK LLC‟s management was the 
decision to structure that company as a manager-managed 
LLC – in other words, GSK Holdings‟ decision not to manage 
GSK LLC.  It is hard to see how that decision, which resulted 
in GSK Holdings continuing to operate as it had before 
SmithKline Beecham‟s conversion to GSK LLC, could 
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involve the kind of transplant that Plaintiffs and Brewer 
describe.
14
       
 
But even if we were to accept Brewer‟s 
characterization, adopting the delegation theory would require 
that we turn our holding in Zambelli upside down.  Zambelli 
and the Supreme Court opinions on which it is based, e.g., 
Carden, 494 U.S. at 189; United Steelworkers of Am. v. R.H. 
Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 146-47 (1965), instruct courts 
that the citizenship of an unincorporated association like a 
limited liability company is determined by looking to the 
citizenship of its members.  592 F.3d at 420.  We are not 
supposed to focus on GSK LLC‟s activities; rather, precedent 
dictates that we turn our attention to the citizenship of GSK 
LLC‟s sole member, GSK Holdings.  While they 
acknowledge that precedent, Plaintiffs ask us to define GSK 
Holdings‟ citizenship by contemplating its status as a member 
of GSK LLC.  Put more simply, to determine the citizenship 
of a limited liability company using Plaintiffs‟ approach, we 
must look to its member, but then, if that member is a holding 
                                              
14
 Notably, Plaintiffs identify no cases, other than 
Brewer and its progeny, that characterize the relationship 
between a manager-managed LLC and its sole member in 
such a manner.  Moreover, Brewer has been rejected in at 
least two district court cases, and Plaintiffs identify no other 
districts that endorse its approach. See Jennings v. HCR 
ManorCare Inc., -- F. Supp. 2d -- , No. 12-1397, 2012 WL 
5360911, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 3, 2012) (“The Court declines to 
adopt the reasoning of Brewer.”); Dalton v. Georgia-Pacific 
L.L.C., No. 12-415, 2012 WL 2072766, at *5 (D.S.C. May 4, 
2012) (same). 
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company, we must immediately look back to the limited 
liability company, reversing the Zambelli analysis entirely.
15
   
 
 GSK Holdings‟ allegedly “unique” relationship with 
GSK LLC does not justify applying that inverted approach.  
See Brewer, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 729 (describing “the unique 
circumstance where the holding company is the sole member 
of a manager-managed limited liability company”).  
According to Brewer, “[w]here the sole member of a limited 
liability company is a holding company … we are presented 
with an anomaly in applying the „nerve center‟ test,” and we 
should consider the LLC‟s activities despite Zambelli‟s 
instruction to the contrary.
16
   774 F. Supp. 2d at 728-29.  But 
                                              
15
 That analysis would also not be limited to the facts 
of this case, as Brewer appears to indicate.  774 F. Supp. 2d at 
728-29; see also Maldonado, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 897 (“The 
Brewer holding is narrower than GSK makes it out to be.  It 
does not apply to all limited liability companies.  Nor does it 
apply to all manager-managed limited liability companies.”).  
According to Brewer, the delegation theory applies only in 
situations “[w]here the sole member of a limited liability 
company is a holding company that holds one constituent 
company and several intra-group accounts.”  Id.  But whether 
an LLC‟s members are holding companies, operating 
companies, or individuals, they must establish the 
management structure for the LLC, either by “delegating” 
that management authority or assuming it (or some 
combination thereof).  Brewer bases its holding on just that – 
the member‟s decision to delegate management authority – 
and there is nothing in that reasoning that limits its 
application to holding companies.  
16
 Maldonado stepped back from that characterization 
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the situation presented here is hardly anomalous.  Holding 
companies are ubiquitous, especially in large business 
enterprises, and courts have been determining their nerve 
centers for decades.
17
  See, e.g., Taber Partners, I v. Merit 
Builders, Inc., 987 F.2d 57, 63 (1st Cir. 1993) (determining 
the nerve center of two holding companies that were partners 
in a limited partnership).  The fact that the holding company 
at issue here holds an LLC rather than a corporation does not, 
in itself, complicate the nerve center analysis. 
 
The argument that we must look to GSK LLC‟s 
activities to identify GSK Holdings‟ nerve center also ignores 
the well-established rule that a parent corporation maintains 
separate citizenship from a subsidiary unless it has exerted 
                                                                                                     
somewhat, explaining that “holding companies and single 
member limited liability companies are not unusual and are, 
indeed, common.”  841 F. Supp. 2d at 894.  It explained that 
the point of Brewer was that “where the sole member of a 
limited liability company is a holding company,” the rules in 
Zambelli and Hertz “intersect,” which raises the “novel” 
question of how the holding company‟s citizenship should be 
defined.  Id.  Therefore, while Maldonado may agree that 
GSK LLC‟s structure is common, it still bases its holding on 
the supposedly unique questions raised by that structure. 
17
 Although Hertz is a recent decision, many circuits 
applied the “nerve center” test before its formal adoption by 
the Supreme Court.  In fact, the First Circuit long ago 
identified the “nerve center” test as the “most appropriate in 
the case of a holding company,” Lugo-Vina v. Pueblo Int’l, 
Inc., 574 F.2d 41, 43 n.2 (1st Cir. 1978), because such 
companies do not have physical operations, Diaz-Rodriguez 
v. Pep Boys Corp, 410 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2005).   
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such an overwhelming level of control over the subsidiary 
that the two companies do not retain separate corporate 
identities.  Quaker State Dyeing & Finishing Co. v. ITT 
Terryphone Corp., 461 F.2d 1140, 1142 (3d Cir. 1972); see 
also Taber Partners, 987 F.2d at 62-63 (emphasizing that, “in 
determining a corporation‟s principal place of business, [the] 
inquiry must focus solely on the business activities of the 
corporation whose principal place of business is at issue”).  
Plaintiffs do not allege that GSK Holdings and GSK LLC 
disregarded corporate formalities, nor do they claim that GSK 
Holdings controls its subsidiary‟s operations.  In fact, they 
argue the opposite, suggesting that we consider GSK LLC‟s 
nerve center in assessing GSK Holdings‟ citizenship because 
GSK Holdings has exerted no managerial control over GSK 
LLC, which is just the opposite of what is typically required 
to consider a parent‟s and subsidiary‟s citizenships jointly.18     
                                              
18
 Plaintiffs attempt to support their approach by citing 
our decision in Mennen Co. v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 
147 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 1998).  In that case, which was decided 
before Hertz, we held that a corporation‟s principal place of 
business was the location in which its “day-to-day activities” 
were carried out.  Mennen, 147 F.3d at 293.  That location 
happened to also be the center of operations of a different 
company, which, pursuant to a management services contract, 
was conducting “the practical work” of the company whose 
citizenship was at issue.  Id.  Based on that precedent, 
Plaintiffs argue that “a court should consider services 
performed by one company on another company‟s behalf to 
determine the latter‟s principal place of business.”  (Reply Br. 
at 1-2.)  But, in addition to being of questionable utility 
because it applied what is now an outdated test for 
determining a corporation‟s principle place of business, 
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 Plaintiffs imply that that counterintuitive approach is 
required by Hertz.  They note that Hertz instructs courts to 
identify a company‟s “actual center of direction, control, and 
coordination,” 130 S. Ct. at 1192, and, because GSK 
Holdings exercises no control over GSK LLC‟s operations, 
they suggest that treating GSK Holdings‟ headquarters 
location as determinative of GSK LLC‟s citizenship would, in 
the words of Maldonado, “exalt form over substance.”  
Maldonado, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 897.  In support of that “form 
over substance” argument, Plaintiffs note the seamless change 
in corporate form from SmithKline Beecham, which was 
indisputably a Pennsylvania citizen, to GSK LLC, which 
Defendants now claim is a Delaware citizen.  No people, 
offices, or operations moved from one state to the other 
during that transition, and so a change in citizenship seems to 
Plaintiffs to be in conflict with Hertz‟s concentration on a 
company‟s “actual center of direction, control, and 
coordination.”  130 S. Ct. at 1192.      
 
 The argument is not without logical appeal, but it 
suffers from two significant problems.  First, it is GSK 
Holdings‟ nerve center – not GSK LLC‟s – that is at issue 
here.  As described above, Hertz‟s “nerve center” test is a 
means of identifying a corporation‟s principal place of 
                                                                                                     
Mennen is readily distinguishable from this case.  Here, GSK 
LLC did not enter into a contract to perform GSK Holdings‟ 
corporate activities; rather, it manages its own affairs as it is 
required to do by its LLC agreement.  Plaintiffs provide no 
explanation for how a contractual agreement to perform 
services on a company‟s behalf is in any way analogous to the 
establishment of the management structure of an LLC, and 
their citation to Mennen is unpersuasive.       
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business.  A limited liability company‟s citizenship is not 
defined by its principal place of business, and thus the 
location of its nerve center is not at issue for purposes for 
establishing diversity jurisdiction.  Hertz therefore does not 
require that we identify the actual center of direction and 
control for GSK LLC – it requires only that we determine 
GSK Holdings‟ center of control. 
 
 More fundamentally, as troubling as those like 
Plaintiffs may find it, form matters for purposes of 
establishing jurisdiction, and the distinction between a 
corporation and an unincorporated entity has tremendous 
jurisdictional significance.  The Supreme Court has 
emphasized that, although a corporation has citizenship, 
unincorporated entities do not, regardless of their substantive 
similarities to corporations.  Carden, 494 U.S. at 195.  
Plaintiffs may denounce that rule as elevating form over 
substance, but it is entirely consistent with the Supreme 
Court‟s approach to jurisdictional questions.  See id. at 196 
(explaining that adherence to rigid rules “has been the 
character of our jurisprudence in this field”); see also Hertz, 
130 S. Ct. at 1186 (insisting that jurisdictional rules “remain 
as simple as possible”).  Therefore, the formal conversion of 
SmithKline Beecham to GSK LLC changes the jurisdictional 
calculus, despite the substantive continuity of business 
operations.  Whereas SmithKline Beecham – a corporation – 
was a citizen of the state in which it had its principal place of 
business, GSK LLC‟s citizenship is defined solely by the 
citizenship of its sole member, GSK Holdings.  Plaintiffs‟ 
delegation theory is an adroit attempt to shift the focus back 
onto GSK LLC‟s nerve center, but that is contrary to the 
approach required by the Supreme Court in Carden and by us 
in Zambelli.  There is nothing in Hertz to change that fact, as 
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Hertz deals solely with the definition of a corporation‟s 
“principal place of business.”   
 
We thus reject Plaintiffs‟ delegation theory, and 
instead proceed, as the District Court in this case did, to 
determine GSK Holdings‟ citizenship by considering its own 
activities, not those of GSK LLC.      
 
  2. GSK Holdings’ Corporate Activities 
 
 Plaintiffs argue that, even looking solely at the 
activities of GSK Holdings, it must be recognized as a citizen 
of Pennsylvania. As each court to examine GSK Holdings has 
agreed, its activities are very limited in scope.  Because it is a 
holding company, not an operating company, GSK Holdings 
has no sales or production, only one part-time employee, and 
little infrastructure.  Instead, its activities consist primarily of 
owning its interest in GSK LLC, holding intra-company 
accounts, issuing and receiving dividends, and paying taxes.  
As the District Court put it, “all holding companies do is 
„hold,‟” Johnson, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 493, and GSK Holdings 
is typical in that regard.   
 
 Hinging its decision largely on that fact, the District 
Court concluded that GSK Holdings‟ principal place of 
business is in Wilmington, Delaware.  Id. at 493.  Although it 
acknowledged that the company‟s “Wilmington „footprint‟ is 
certainly modest,” the Court “measure[d] that footprint … 
against the modest scope of Holdings‟[] activities.”  Id. at 
492.  Finding that GSK Holdings‟ three-person board controls 
all of its limited, ownership-related activities, and that it does 
so “through resolutions that are considered and passed in 
Wilmington,” id., the Court concluded that its actual center of 
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direction, control, and coordination is in Delaware.  Id. at 
492-96; see also Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1192 (holding that a 
corporation‟s principal place of business is “the place where a 
corporation‟s officers direct, control, and coordinate the 
corporation‟s activities”).  Accordingly, the Court held that 
GSK Holdings is not a Pennsylvania citizen.  Johnson, 853 F. 
Supp. 2d at 493; see also id. at 495 (“Holdings‟[] nerve center 
is where its ownership decisions are made: Wilmington.”).   
 
 Plaintiffs argue that that conclusion contradicts Hertz, 
which specifically states that an office used solely for board 
meetings “attended by directors … who have traveled there 
for the occasion” should not be considered a company‟s 
actual center of direction and control.  130 S. Ct. at 1192; see 
also id. at 1195 (warning that an “alleged „nerve center‟ [that] 
is nothing more than a mail drop box, a bare office with a 
computer, or the location of an annual executive retreat” 
might be an attempt at jurisdictional manipulation).  GSK 
Holdings‟ ten-by-ten foot office in Wilmington closely fits 
that description, and Plaintiffs contend that the evidence 
demonstrates that no substantive decision-making could have 
occurred there.  As Brewer put it, “the undisputed fact that the 
quarterly board meetings of [GSK] Holdings last no more 
than 15 or 20 minutes belies any argument that any 
operational or strategic decisions affecting the business 
activities are made during [those] brief meetings.”  774 F. 
Supp. 2d. at 731.  Plaintiffs also dismiss the role of GSK 
Holdings‟ Wilmington-based director, Donald McLamb, 
noting that he “performs only administrative functions” 
(Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 33), spends only about four hours 
per year conducting GSK Holdings‟ business, and serves as a 
director for numerous other companies.  Citing all of those 
facts, Plaintiffs argue that no real decisions could have been 
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made during the board meetings and that the board‟s 
decisions must have been made elsewhere and simply ratified 
in Wilmington.  Therefore, Plaintiffs say, Wilmington cannot 
be GSK Holdings‟ principal place of business under Hertz, as 
it is not GSK Holdings‟ actual center of direction and control. 
 
 Again Plaintiffs‟ reasoning has force but there are 
flaws that substantially weaken it.  First, as the District Court 
rightly noted, the kind of board meetings denigrated in Hertz 
were being considered in the context of a case involving “a 
sprawling operating company,” with “extensive activities 
carried out by 11,230 employees at facilities in 44 states.”  
Johnson, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 493.  For a holding company 
such as GSK Holdings, relatively short, quarterly board 
meetings may well be all that is required to direct and control 
the company‟s limited work.  As former director Julian 
Heslop explained, the board generally conducts three tasks at 
each meeting: (1) it approves or corrects the minutes from the 
previous meeting, (2) it reviews the company‟s financial 
statements with George Brown, a London-based accountant 
who provides financial services to GSK Holdings, and (3) it 
addresses “any other business required to come before the 
meeting,” such as authorizing agents to sign documents, 
making changes to the officers, paying a dividend, or, 
occasionally, restructuring the company‟s holdings.  (App. at 
709.) Generally, such business is straightforward and takes 
little time, yet it constitutes GSK Holdings‟ primary activity: 
managing its assets.  The location of board meetings is 
therefore a more significant jurisdictional fact here than it was 
in Hertz, and the meetings‟ brevity does not necessarily 
reflect an absence of substantive decision-making.
19
   
                                              
19
 The significance of that fact is further demonstrated 
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 Second, the District Court‟s factual finding that GSK 
Holdings‟ board controls its investment activities through 
consensus-based resolutions at its meetings in Wilmington is 
not clearly erroneous.  See McCann, 458 F.3d at 286 
                                                                                                     
by the numerous post-Hertz cases that have determined the 
principal place of business of a holding company by looking 
to the location in which its officers or directors meet to make 
high-level management decisions.  See Lewis v. Lycoming, 
No. 11-6475, 2012 WL 2422451, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 
2012) (concluding that a holding company‟s nerve center is 
the place where its officers made major business decisions, 
not the location of its “public persona”); Freedom Envtl. 
Servs., Inc. v. Borish, No. 12-665, 2012 WL 2505723, at *1 
(M.D. Fla. June 20, 2012) (considering the location of a 
holding company‟s board meetings in assessing its 
citizenship); Sebastian Holdings, Inc. v. Kugler, No. 08-1131, 
2012 WL 1190837, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2012) 
(determining a holding company‟s citizenship based on the 
location in which its owner and director made management 
decisions); Balachander v. AET Inc., No. 10-4805, 2011 WL 
4500048, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2011) (relying on the 
location in which the company‟s chief officers make 
management decisions); Ortiz v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 
No. 11-0055, 2011 WL 3584832, at *2 (W.D. La. Aug 12, 
2011) (looking to where the holding company‟s directors 
make overall policy decisions, not to where its subsidiaries 
manage their day-to-day activities); cf. Astra Oil Trading N.V. 
v. Petrobras Am. Inc., No. 09-1274, 2010 WL 3069793, at *3 
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2010) (declining to use the location of the 
board of directors, but only because the company‟s sole 
officer had “significant independent authority as CEO … to 
direct, control, and coordinate [the company‟s] activities”).  
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(applying clear error review to factual findings regarding 
citizenship and domicile).  Each of GSK Holdings‟ three 
directors testified that only the board can authorize GSK 
Holdings to take a new action relating to its investments, and 
that the board does so by adopting resolutions at quarterly or 
special board meetings.  None of GSK Holdings‟ individual 
directors or officers can take “new, unauthorized actions” on 
GSK Holdings‟ behalf, nor can GlaxoSmithKline plc, its 
ultimate parent in London, do so.  (App. at 707-08.)  The 
directors further explained that although individuals in 
Philadelphia and London provide various services to the 
board and sometimes sign documents, receive money, or pay 
taxes for GSK Holdings, the scope of their actions is 
“constrained by what the Board of Directors authorizes.”  
(App. at 714.)  Those individuals cannot make fundamental 
decisions – that power lies solely with the board.   
 
 The evidence also supports the District Court‟s finding 
that the board actually makes its decisions during its 
meetings, rather than simply ratifying decisions made 
elsewhere, as Plaintiffs claim.  Although it is uncontested that 
“strategic direction and guidance … emanate[] from London” 
(App. at 710), as they likely do for all of the companies in the 
GSK group, GSK Holdings‟ directors insist that the board‟s 
decisions are not preordained.  On the contrary, director 
Heslop explained that “[w]e sit down as a Board at our 
meetings … and go through the papers and make the 
decisions required of those meetings.”  (App. at 709.)  Each 
director, including Wilmington-based director Donald 
McLamb, testified that he exercises his independent judgment 
in making those decisions and is not controlled by the other 
directors, officers, or corporate entities.  In fact, McLamb 
explained that, as a Certified Public Accountant (“CPA”) with 
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significant experience working under Delaware corporate 
law, he occupies an important role on the board, providing 
“assurance that [the] company will operate within the laws 
and proper corporate governance of Delaware,” “looking out 
for the best interest of the shareholders” as an independent 
director, and ensuring that the board‟s decisions “are 
reasonable in nature and make good business sense.”  (App. 
at 785.)  Such evidence, credited by the District Court, is 
enough to support the finding that the board engages in 
substantive decision-making during its meetings in 
Wilmington.  See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-74 (holding that 
a court of appeals may not reverse a district court‟s factual 
finding if that court‟s “account of the evidence is plausible in 
light of the record viewed in its entirety”).20   
                                              
 
20
 Our concurring colleague disagrees, and says that 
“[t]he record does not support” the District Court‟s finding.  
(Concurring Op. at 6.)  Rather, in his view, there is “no 
doubt” that any direction, control, or coordination exercised 
by GSK Holdings‟ board must have “been in line with the 
wishes of Heslop.”  (Id.)  While our colleague is free to 
harbor his doubts, we are bound to a standard of review that 
does not permit us “to conduct a de novo review of the 
evidence.”  Newark Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Bayonne, 
134 F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, “[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or other 
evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).  The District Court considered the 
evidence, including statements by the board members, all of 
whom said they exercised independent judgment at board 
meetings and that the resolutions they adopted were not 
preordained.  The District Court thus had a reasonable basis 
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 Finally, despite Plaintiffs‟ insistence to the contrary, 
Hertz actually reinforces the District Court‟s conclusion that, 
in light of those factual findings, GSK Holdings‟ nerve center 
is in Wilmington.  Even while cautioning courts to identify a 
corporation‟s actual center of direction and control, Hertz 
“place[d] primary weight upon the need for judicial 
administration of a jurisdictional statute to remain as simple 
as possible.”  130 S. Ct. at 1186.  The Supreme Court 
recognized that adopting the “nerve center” test would not 
resolve every ambiguity, and that “there will be hard cases.”  
Id. at 1194.  In fact, the Court specifically observed that, “in 
this era of telecommuting, some corporations may divide their 
command and coordinating functions among officers who 
work at several different locations, perhaps communicating 
over the Internet.”  Id.  Rather than requiring courts facing 
such situations to weigh those different functions, Hertz 
reminded us that the “nerve center” test “points courts in a 
single direction, towards the center of overall direction, 
control, and coordination.”  Id. 
 
                                                                                                     
on which to draw a factual conclusion about who was making 
decisions for GSK Holdings and where they were doing it.  
We are not at liberty to substitute our own reading of the facts 
when, as here, there is evidence directly supporting the 
District Court‟s finding.  See McCann, 458 F.3d at 268 
(“[O]ur sole function is to review the record to determine 
whether the findings of the District Court were clearly 
erroneous, i.e., whether we are left with a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).         
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 Here, it is clear that people in both Philadelphia and 
London contribute to GSK Holdings‟ operations.  From 
London, George Brown prepares the financial documents 
reviewed during board meetings, Helen Jones oversees 
complex tax matters, Sarah-Jane Chilver-Stainer facilitates 
certain investments, and Julian Heslop‟s staff provide overall 
strategic guidance.  From Philadelphia, Jan Lyons prepares 
GSK Holdings‟ tax return and provides tax advice, Audrey 
Klijian facilitates other investments and payments, and 
Michael Corrigan prepares for board meetings and carries out 
actions on GSK Holdings‟ behalf.  Faced with this situation, 
we “do not have to try to weigh” those various corporate 
functions to determine GSK Holdings‟ principal place of 
business, but rather should look “towards the center of overall 
direction, control, and coordination.”  Id.  All of the functions 
described above are intended to inform or facilitate the 
decisions of GSK Holdings‟ board of directors, which has the 
sole authority to adopt binding resolutions affecting the 
corporation‟s investments.  Thus, the “single direction” in 
which the nerve center test points is toward the location of 
those decisions.  As the District Court ably concluded from 
the evidence, that location is in Wilmington, Delaware.
21
   
                                              
21
   In so concluding, we are not, as our concurring 
colleague implies, carving out a holding-company exception 
to Hertz.  Rather, we are faithfully applying Hertz‟s 
instruction to identify “the actual center of direction, control, 
and coordination” of a corporation.  130 S. Ct. at 1192.  To do 
so, we first have to acknowledge the nature of the 
corporation‟s activities, as it is difficult to locate a 
corporation‟s brain without first identifying its body.  In this 
case, GSK Holdings‟ sole function is to hold assets.  
Therefore, the question under Hertz is where that activity is 
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controlled and directed.  When, as here, the evidence suggests 
that the board of directors actually controlled that activity, we 
do not think that Hertz requires us to ignore that fact and look 
instead to the location of certain corporate officers.  
Moreover, even if we were to look to GSK Holdings‟ officers 
(three of whom are also the members of the board of 
directors), the conclusion regarding the company‟s nerve 
center is not as clear as our colleague suggests.  GSK 
Holdings has two officers in London, two in Philadelphia, and 
two in Wilmington, and each performs different functions.  If 
we were to weigh those functions, we might agree that some 
of the most important work is performed in London, but that 
involves the type of balancing that Hertz eschews, and, in any 
event, it is not necessary when the facts, as found by the 
District Court, suggest that this particular corporation did not 
vest the relevant decision-making in its officers. 
Our conclusion on this record does not mean that the 
location of board meetings will always determine a holding 
company‟s citizenship.  If a holding company‟s officers, not 
its directors, actually control the company‟s core activities, or 
if the company‟s board makes decisions in one location and 
simply ratifies them in another, the holding company is 
unlikely to be a citizen of a state simply because that is where 
it holds its board meetings.  Here, however, the record 
supports the conclusion that, although an array of support 
services were provided from different locations, the board 
controlled the company‟s core activities through decision-
making at board meetings located in Delaware.  In such an 
instance, Hertz encourages rather than discourages our 
looking to the location of the board meetings as the center of 
direction and control.            
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  3. Jurisdictional Manipulation 
 
 Having concluded that GSK Holdings‟ nerve center is 
in Delaware, we now turn briefly to Plaintiffs‟ contention that 
that outcome is impermissible under Hertz because it would 
condone jurisdictional manipulation.  Hertz cautioned that, “if 
the record reveals attempts at [jurisdictional] manipulation 
…[,] the courts should instead take as the „nerve center‟ the 
place of actual direction, control, and coordination, in the 
absence of such manipulation.”  Id. at 1195.  Plaintiffs argue 
that there is evidence of jurisdictional manipulation here and 
that we should not encourage that manipulation by 
concluding that GSK Holdings is a Delaware citizen.  
Specifically, they note that GSK Holdings altered its bylaws 
and sought to amend government documents associating it 
with a Philadelphia address.  They allege that GSK Holdings 
made those post-discovery alterations to “bolster [its] 
contention … that [its] principal place of business is in 
Wilmington” (Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 46 (quoting 
Brewer, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 731)), and thus facilitate its 
removal of “hundreds of personal injury cases” that 
previously were in Pennsylvania state court (id. at 45).  
Brewer agreed, commenting that the post-discovery alteration 
“smacks of jurisdictional manipulation.”22  774 F. Supp. 2d at 
730. 
                                              
22
 Brewer was careful to explain that it did not consider 
the transition from SmithKline Beecham to GSK LLC to 
itself be an attempt at jurisdictional manipulation, noting that 
“[GSK] LLC was formed to accomplish a legitimate business 
purpose and not to manipulate jurisdiction for litigation 
purposes.”  774 F. Supp. 2d at 730.  Plaintiffs conceded that 
point at oral argument, but they suggest that GSK Holdings 
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 The record, however, squarely contradicts that 
contention.  Although Defendants concede that, until recently, 
GSK Holdings‟ bylaws indicated that its headquarters and 
board meetings were in Philadelphia, as did a number of 
summaries of government contracts produced by government 
agencies, Defendants also presented uncontested evidence 
that those documents were inaccurate, and thus they could not 
have affected GSK Holdings‟ principal place of business.  See 
Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 115 (rejecting the notion that “the mere 
filing of a form … listing a corporation‟s „principal executive 
offices‟ would, without more, be sufficient proof to establish 
a corporation‟s „nerve center‟”); Mennen Co. v. Atlantic Mut. 
Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 287, 293-94 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting 
representations of a company‟s principal place of business 
that “run contrary to the empirical facts with which the 
jurisdictional inquiry is concerned”).  Adjusting those 
documents to reflect the reality of GSK Holdings‟ operations 
therefore did not affect jurisdiction, much less “manipulate” it 
improperly.  Furthermore, although Plaintiffs express concern 
that GSK Holdings could easily manipulate jurisdiction by 
changing the location of its board meetings, they do not allege 
that that actually occurred here.  Had GSK Holdings moved 
its board meetings in anticipation of litigation, the analysis of 
this issue could very well be different, but GSK Holdings‟ 
board has been meeting in Wilmington since 2001.  There is 
simply no evidence of jurisdictional manipulation, and the 
District Court properly concluded that GSK Holdings‟ 
                                                                                                     
may have located its meetings in Delaware to gain a 
jurisdictional benefit.  They presented no evidence of such an 
intent, however, and that suggestion is belied by the fact that 
GSK Holdings began holding its board meetings in Delaware 
long before GSK LLC was formed.    
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principal place of business has consistently been in Delaware.  
The conclusion thus remains that, as GSK Holdings is GSK 
LLC‟s sole member, neither of the GSK Defendants is a 
Pennsylvania citizen.
23
  
 
 B. Citizenship of the Remaining Defendants 
 
 Plaintiffs‟ fall-back argument is that SmithKline 
Beecham and Avantor Performance Materials are 
Pennsylvania citizens, which, if true, would defeat diversity 
                                              
23
 Our concurring colleague worries about 
manipulation in future cases, expressing concern that our 
approach “will encourage parties to shift the location or 
formal authority of their corporate boards in order to create 
citizenship where those board meetings are held.”  
(Concurring Op. at 8.)  We repeat, however, that evidence of 
manipulation – which is entirely lacking here – may well alter 
the calculus.  If there is such evidence, Hertz authorizes 
courts to disregard the attempts at manipulation, so the 
expressed concern is inordinate.  Of much greater concern 
would be a rule in keeping with our colleague‟s focus on the 
location of strategic decision-making, as it would risk 
disregarding the distinctions among the various corporate 
entities that often comprise large business enterprises.  Julian 
Heslop‟s team in London likely made strategic decisions that 
guided the activities of all of the corporations in the GSK 
group.  Under our colleague‟s approach, London could 
therefore be considered the “brain” of each and every GSK-
related corporation, thus defining all of their citizenships.  
Such an outcome would disregard our rule that parent and 
subsidiary corporations retain separate corporate identities.  
See Quaker State, 461 F.2d at 1142.                     
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jurisdiction even though the GSK Defendants are citizens of 
Delaware. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (requiring complete 
diversity).  They contend that, although SmithKline Beecham 
converted to GSK LLC and dissolved as a Pennsylvania 
entity, Pennsylvania law preserves its citizenship for diversity 
jurisdiction purposes.  As for Avantor, Plaintiffs concede that 
the corporation officially moved its operations from New 
Jersey to Pennsylvania five days after Defendants removed 
this action, but they suggest that Avantor‟s leadership may 
have already been operating from Pennsylvania at the time of 
removal.  The District Court disagreed on both counts, 
finding that Avantor‟s headquarters moved at the same time 
as the rest of its operations, Johnson, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 496, 
and concluding that SmithKline Beecham‟s preserved 
citizenship is irrelevant because it is a nominal party that 
lacks a “real interest in the litigation,” id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
24
  We see no reason to disturb those rulings. 
 
  1. SmithKline Beecham 
 
 “[T]he „citizens‟ upon whose diversity a plaintiff 
grounds jurisdiction must be real and substantial parties to the 
                                              
24
 The District Court did not specifically address 
SmithKline Beecham‟s citizenship in its discussion of 
diversity jurisdiction, but Plaintiffs raised SmithKline‟s 
citizenship as a basis for remand, and the Court analyzed 
whether the company retained an interest in the litigation 
before denying Plaintiffs‟ request.  Johnson, 853 F. Supp. 2d 
at 489, 496-97.  Therefore, we understand that it declined to 
treat SmithKline as a Pennsylvania citizen due to its 
conclusion that the company was not a “real party in interest” 
to the controversy.  Id. at 497.      
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controversy.”  Navarro Savings Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 
460 (1980).  “Thus, a federal court must disregard nominal or 
formal parties,” id. at 461, and can base its jurisdiction only 
upon the citizenship of parties with “a real interest in the 
litigation,” Bumberger v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 952 F.2d 764, 
767 (3d Cir. 1991).   
 
 Plaintiffs are correct that, generally speaking, 
Pennsylvania law preserves for a limited time a dissolved 
corporation‟s interest in litigation against it.  The 
Pennsylvania code provides that, “[e]very business 
corporation that is dissolved … shall, nevertheless, continue 
to exist for the purpose of … prosecuting and defending 
actions or proceedings by or against it … .”  15 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 1978.  It also ensures that the dissolution of a 
corporation does “not eliminate nor impair any remedy 
available to or against” it for a period of two years.  Id. 
§ 1979.  We have held that when such a state statute renders a 
dissolved corporation “sufficiently alive to sue,” the 
corporation also retains its citizenship for purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction.  Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 
115 F.2d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 1940), rev’d on other grounds, 
313 U.S. 487 (1941); see also Ripalda v. Am. Operations 
Corp., 977 F.2d 1464, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[A] state 
statute extending the life of a dissolved corporation for the 
purpose of being sued also preserves the corporation as a 
citizen of the state of incorporation for the purpose of 
determining diversity of citizenship.”).  Accordingly, 
SmithKline Beecham‟s dissolution as a Pennsylvania 
corporation did not, standing alone, destroy its Pennsylvania 
citizenship or the import of that citizenship.
25
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 SmithKline dissolved on October 27, 2009, not quite 
 47 
 
 But SmithKline Beecham did not simply dissolve – it 
“domesticated itself under the laws of another jurisdiction,” 
15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1980, becoming a Delaware 
corporation and then converting to a Delaware limited 
liability company.  See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 265 
(regarding conversion of a foreign entity into a Delaware 
corporation); id. tit. 6, § 18-214 (regarding conversion of a 
Delaware corporation into a Delaware LLC).  That company 
– GSK LLC – has stepped into SmithKline Beecham‟s shoes, 
and, under Delaware law, all of SmithKline Beecham‟s 
“debts, liabilities and duties” now lie with GSK LLC.  Id. tit. 
6, § 18-214(f); id. tit. 8, § 265(f).
26
  SmithKline Beecham thus 
                                                                                                     
two years before Plaintiffs filed their complaint.  See 15 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1979 (preserving remedies against a 
dissolved company for two years).    
26
 Those two provisions govern, respectively, the 
transition from a foreign corporation to a Delaware 
corporation, and from a Delaware corporation to a Delaware 
LLC.  Title 8, § 265(f) provides that: 
When an other entity has been converted to a 
corporation of this State pursuant to this 
section, the corporation of this State shall, for 
all purposes of the laws of the State of 
Delaware, be deemed to be the same entity as 
the converting other entity. … [A]ll rights of 
creditors and all liens upon any property of such 
other entity shall be preserved unimpaired, and 
all debts, liabilities and duties of the other entity 
that has converted shall remain attached to the 
corporation of this State to which such other 
entity has converted, and may be enforced 
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has no actual interest in the outcome of the litigation, making 
it a “nominal party.”  See Bumberger, 952 F.2d at 767 
(explaining that a “nominal party” is one that lacks “a real 
interest in the litigation”); see also Strotek Corp. v. Air 
Transp. Ass’n of Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that a dissolved entity whose liabilities had been 
transferred to a different entity is not a real party in interest).  
Therefore, although SmithKline Beecham may technically 
still be a Pennsylvania citizen, we must disregard its 
citizenship for purposes of establishing diversity 
jurisdiction.
27
        
                                                                                                     
against it to the same extent as if said debts, 
liabilities and duties had originally been 
incurred or contracted by it in its capacity as a 
corporation of this State.  
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 265(f).  The language of Title 6, § 18-
214(f) is very similar, providing, inter alia, that: 
[A]ll debts, liabilities and duties of the other 
entity that has converted shall remain attached 
to the domestic limited liability company to 
which such other entity has converted, and may 
be enforced against it to the same extent as if 
said debts, liabilities and duties had originally 
been incurred or contracted by it in its capacity 
as a domestic limited liability company. 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-214(f).   
27
 For the same reason, SmithKline‟s apparent failure 
to consent to removal also does not provide a basis for 
remand.  Although removal generally requires “unanimity 
among the defendants,” that requirement does not extend to 
nominal parties.  Balazik v. Cnty. of Dauphin, 44 F.3d 209, 
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  2. Avantor Performance Materials 
  
 Avantor‟s citizenship also does not provide a basis for 
remand.  Plaintiffs argue that Defendants, who bear the 
burden of proof, have “not presented any evidence that 
[Avantor‟s] officers directed, controlled, and coordinated its 
activities in New Jersey, rather than Pennsylvania, as of the 
date of removal.”  (Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 48.)  Although 
Plaintiffs concede that the corporation officially moved its 
operations from New Jersey to Pennsylvania after Defendants 
removed this action, they suggest that Avantor‟s leadership 
may have begun operating from Pennsylvania before 
removal.  The District Court saw things differently, finding 
that Avantor‟s headquarters moved from New Jersey to 
Pennsylvania at the same time as its rank-and-file employees 
– “five days after Defendants removed the case.”  Johnson, 
853 F. Supp. 2d at 495.  Based on that finding, the Court 
concluded that, “at all relevant times, Avantor was a citizen 
of New Jersey, not Pennsylvania.”  Id.    
 
 The date when Avantor‟s officers began controlling 
the company from Pennsylvania is purely a question of fact, 
and we therefore review the District Court‟s determination for 
clear error.  McCann, 458 F.3d at 286.  The Court based its 
finding on two affidavits from Avantor‟s general counsel, an 
internal company memorandum, and a newspaper report, each 
of which indicates that the entire company moved into its new 
                                                                                                     
213 (3d Cir. 1995); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) 
(requiring that “all defendants who have been properly joined 
and served must join in or consent to the removal of the 
action”). 
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Pennsylvania headquarters on September 19, 2011, after the 
case was removed.  In response, Plaintiffs point to evidence 
that a number of corporate documents listed Avantor‟s 
Pennsylvania address prior to removal, and the fact that its 
CEO gave an interview from the new headquarters two days 
before the move (which, notably, is still after the date of 
removal).  As the District Court explained, however, none of 
that evidence contradicts Avantor‟s account of the actual 
move, Johnson, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 495, and we cannot say 
that the Court‟s finding was clearly erroneous.  Given its view 
of the facts, the District Court was correct to conclude that 
Avantor‟s nerve center was in New Jersey at all times 
relevant to this litigation, as its New Jersey headquarters was 
its actual center of direction and control at the time the 
complaint was filed and at the time of removal.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 The District Court rightly held that GSK LLC and 
GSK Holdings are both citizens of Delaware, that SmithKline 
Beecham is a nominal party, and that Avantor was a citizen of 
New Jersey at the time this case was removed.  As none of 
those Defendants was, at the time of removal, a citizen of a 
state where Plaintiffs are citizens, the parties satisfy the 
diversity of citizenship requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  The 
District Court thus had original jurisdiction over the matter, 
making removal proper, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), and we must 
affirm the order denying Plaintiffs‟ motion for remand.   
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment 
 I agree with my colleagues that the District Court 
properly denied Plaintiffs‘ motion to remand this case to state 
court.  Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating 
that complete diversity exists between the opposing parties.  
Plaintiffs are citizens of Louisiana and Pennsylvania.  Their 
arguments that Defendants—including GlaxoSmithKline 
Holdings (―GSK Holdings‖ or ―Holdings‖) and 
GlaxoSmithKline LLC (―GSK LLC‖)—are also citizens of 
Pennsylvania I find wanting for the reasons set out in Judge 
Jordan‘s comprehensive and well-crafted opinion.  As that 
opinion notes, the citizenship of GSK LLC depends on the 
citizenship of its sole member,
1
 GSK Holdings, which is 
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 It is undisputed that GSK LLC is headquartered in 
Pennsylvania, where it operates its pharmaceutical business, 
and would not be diverse from Plaintiffs if it were deemed a 
citizen of its principal place of business.  Thus our case is 
made more complicated by the doctrinal rule that 
unincorporated entities are treated like partnerships, instead 
of corporations, for diversity purposes.  Carden v. Akroma 
Assocs., 494 U.S. 185 (1990); Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. 
Wood, 592 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2010).  This test has been 
widely criticized.  See, e.g., Christine M. Kailus, Note, 
Diversity Jurisdiction and Unincorporated Businesses: 
Collapsing the Doctrinal Wall, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1543; 
Debra R. Cohen, Limited Liability Company Citizenship: 
Reconsidering an Illogical and Inconsistent Choice, 90 Marq. 
L. Rev. 269 (2006); Robert J. Tribeck, Cracking the 
Doctrinal Wall of Chapman v. Barney: A New Diversity Test 
for Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 5 
2 
 
deemed for purposes of diversity jurisdiction a citizen ―of the 
State or foreign state where it has its principal place of 
business.‖  28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).  
 I write separately because I cannot agree with the 
conclusion in Part III.A.2 of the majority opinion that GSK 
Holdings‘ principal place of business is Wilmington, 
Delaware, where its board of directors holds very brief 
quarterly meetings.  The parties disputed whether Holdings‘ 
principal place of business was Delaware or Pennsylvania, 
and the record is limited by their adherence to this dichotomy.  
But I believe that the facts and law point to a third option, that 
GSK Holdings‘ principal place of business is the United 
Kingdom, where the company‘s strategic direction is 
determined.  Although our difference of opinion does not 
affect the outcome of this case, I believe that my colleagues‘ 
conclusion is in tension with Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 
77, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010), and, unless Hertz is changed or 
clarified by the Supreme Court, sets an incorrect precedent 
that will affect corporate citizenship rulings in future cases.   
I. 
                                                                                                     
Widener J. Pub. L. 89 (1995).  Although this is not the case to 
revisit our holding in Zambelli (the issue was not even briefed 
and, in any event, Zambelli follows the lead of the Supreme 
Court in Carden), further understanding in this area may 
make the issue more pressing, especially if LLCs continue to 
complicate jurisdictional determinations.  Perhaps Congress is 
most likely to effect change, as it did under the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10) (―[f]or the 
purpose of this section . . . an unincorporated association shall 
be deemed to be a citizen of the State where it has its 
principal place of business‖).  
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 In Hertz, the Supreme Court defined a corporation‘s 
principal place of business under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) as 
―the place where a corporation‘s officers direct, control, and 
coordinate the corporation‘s activities,‖  called its ―nerve 
center.‖  130 S. Ct. at 1192 (emphasis added).  That nerve 
center is ―not simply an office where the corporation holds its 
board meetings (for example, attended by directors and 
officers who have traveled there for the occasion).‖  Id.  
While acknowledging this limitation, my colleagues conclude 
that the location of the board of directors‘ meetings takes on 
increased jurisdictional significance when the entity involved 
is a holding company such as GSK Holdings.  Majority Op. at 
34–35.  Their analysis has the effect of treating holding 
corporations differently than operating corporations. 
 Without clarification from the Supreme Court, I am 
skeptical that a corporation‘s status as a holding company 
changes the Hertz analysis.  True, holding companies are 
different from operating companies because they hold and 
invest assets rather than manufacture, service, or sell.  But 
whether a corporation holds or operates tells us little about its 
―actual center of direction, control, and coordination,‖  
metaphorically called its ―brain‖ or ―nerve center.‖  Hertz, 
130 S. Ct. at 1192–93.  The terms ―hold‖ and ―operate‖ refer 
to what a corporation does with the assets it owns, but not 
necessarily who controls its actions and how extensive those 
actions may be.  As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
acknowledged in Taber Partners, many holding companies 
are more than lifeless corporate structures.  They may be 
quite active in investing or managing their assets.  Taber 
Partners, I v. Merit Builders, Inc., 987 F.2d 57, 63–64 n.9 
(1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that the holding companies in that 
case ―operate out of New York,‖ which is the location of 
their office, employees, bank accounts, working capital 
accounts, corporate books and records, and board meetings).  
Because holding companies have their own corporate 
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operations (though not as extensive as a typical operating 
company), I don‘t see the need to distinguish holding 
companies from the operating company addressed in Hertz.   
 My colleagues cite no case where a court has relied 
solely on the location of the board of directors‘ meeting to 
determine a holding company‘s principal place of business, 
nor has my research revealed one.  Indeed, in all of the cases I 
have found—including all of the cases cited by my 
colleagues, see Majority Op. at 35 n.19—district courts have 
determined the actual place of control of holding companies 
by considering the location, responsibility, and functions of 
corporate officers, just as Hertz requires.  See, e.g., Lewis v. 
Lycoming, No. 11-6475, 2012 WL 2422451, at *5–6 (E.D. 
Pa. June 27, 2012) (determining nerve center based on place 
of review of monthly financial reports and strategic plans, 
candidate interviews, and personnel decisions); Sebastian 
Holdings, Inc. v. Kugler, No. 08-1131, 2012 WL 1190837, at 
*3 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2012) (determining nerve center based 
on officer‘s travel schedule, office locations, and meetings 
with strategic advisors).   
 As district courts seem to have had no trouble applying 
the Hertz test to holding companies, I am unpersuaded by the 
majority‘s argument that board of directors‘ meetings should 
be considered for the sake of administrative simplicity.  If 
simplicity is the goal of a rule, no doubt it is quite simple to 
rule that a holding company, which holds and invests assets 
entrusted to it, is a citizen where its directors decree formally 
what those investments will be.  But for now the test is what 
the brain tells the body to do, and here I do not think that 
brain is in Delaware.   
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II. 
 In determining a corporation‘s brain or nerve center, 
Hertz has us look to where the corporation‘s officers make 
leadership decisions about the company.  130 S. Ct. at 1193.  
In our case, I believe that is the United Kingdom, where GSK 
Holdings‘ ―strategic direction and guidance . . . emanates 
from.‖ 2  App. at 710.  Julian Heslop, GSK Holdings‘ then-
highest ranking officer and stationed in the United Kingdom,
3
 
testified that his staff there produces the ―strategy and 
strategic formulation‖ for the company and ―anything that 
impinges upon Holdings . . . that relates to strategic 
formulation.‖  Id. at 710, 715.  Similarly, ―investment 
decisions for GSK Holdings,‖ a principal activity of a holding 
company, are made under the direction of its officer Sara-
Jane Chilver-Stainer, who is also based in the U.K.  Id. at 
684.    
 In contrast, relatively little is done in Delaware at GSK 
Holdings‘ perfunctory quarterly board meetings, which last 
from 15 to 30 minutes.  Id. at 686.  Two of the directors, 
Heslop and Michael Corrigan, often participate by phone 
                                              
2
 Like my colleagues, I am concerned solely with GSK 
Holdings‘ principal place of business and not the nerve center 
of its parent or subsidiary companies. We have no reason to 
disregard Holdings‘ separate corporate identity.  Quaker State 
Dying & Finishing Co. v. ITT Terryphone Corp., 461 F.2d 
1140 (3d Cir. 1972).  
 
3
 Heslop retired prior to this case‘s removal, but the parties 
proceeded on a record produced before his retirement, and 
there is no evidence that GSK Holdings‘ corporate structure 
or activities changed after his departure.  See Majority Op. at 
10 n.7.  
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from their offices outside of Delaware.  Id. at 695, 823.  
When he did attend in person, Heslop spent only enough time 
in Wilmington to attend Holdings‘ short Board meeting.  Id. 
at 969.  Often only the third director, Donald McLamb, a 
Wilmington Trust Services employee who is a director for 
dozens of other companies and spends less than ten hours per 
year on GSK Holdings, is present in Delaware.  Id. at 756–57; 
761–62.   Board meetings consist primarily of three tasks: (1) 
approving or correcting minutes from the previous meeting; 
(2) reviewing the company‘s financial statements; and (3) 
addressing other necessary business, such as authorizing 
agents to act on GSK Holdings‘ behalf, approving dividend 
payments, or occasionally restructuring the company‘s 
holdings.  Id. at 709–10.  Only the last task could be 
considered a form of direction, control, or coordination, and 
no doubt it has been in line with the wishes of Heslop (and 
now his successor), whose team in the U.K. determines the 
strategy for the company.       
 I do not agree with my colleagues that the record 
supports their conclusion that the Board actually serves as the 
―brain‖ of GSK Holdings.  The District Court—whose ―ruling 
as to jurisdiction turn[ed] largely on the differences between a 
‗holding company‘ and an ‗operating company‘‖—found that 
―Holdings‘[] three Directors require no more than four 15- to 
30- minute Board meetings a year to manage Holdings‘[] 
affairs‖ and ―the Board . . . controls all Holdings‘[] actions . . 
. in Wilmington.‖  Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 
853 F. Supp. 2d 487, 491–92 (E.D. Pa. 2012).  My colleagues 
uphold this finding, explaining that ―relatively short, quarterly 
board meetings may well be all that is required to direct and 
control the company‘s limited work.‖  Majority Op. at 35.  
The record does not support that conclusion.  The District 
Court relied on Heslop‘s testimony that the ―Board makes 
those‖ decisions ―that actually control the activities of GSK 
Holdings‖ as well as the testimony of all three directors that 
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Holdings cannot take ―new, unauthorized‖ actions without 
Board approval.  App. at 707–08, 786, 823.   As Heslop 
rightly explains, this is ―very much traditional corporate 
governance,‖  id. at 708, and could, it seems to me, be said of 
every corporation.  A board of directors usually has the 
authority to make decisions that govern the corporation, but 
that authority is not the same as actual control; if it were, the 
nerve center test would always point to the location of the 
board of directors‘ meetings, contrary to what Hertz requires.        
 Moreover, these general statements of authority do not 
square with the scope of the activities of GSK Holdings.  It 
―holds financial assets and liabilities‖ that include GSK LLC 
(a multi-billion dollar company and the GlaxoSmithKline 
family group‘s primary pharmaceutical business in the United 
States).  Id. at 593, 672.  It has held ―more than $10 billion of 
intra-[GSK] group debt,‖ serves as the ―lead American 
company‖ for U.S. tax purposes, and ―has litigated over its 
rights and obligations.‖  Id. at 593, 688–89.   There is no 
evidence that any actual analysis presaging GSK Holdings‘ 
major actions on these issues—such as the conversion of 
SmithKline Beecham to GSK LLC or Holdings‘ tax, 
investing, and litigation strategies—occurred, or could occur, 
during short board meetings held in Delaware.  Id. at 709–10.  
Instead, the evidence shows that the actual oversight and 
control of these strategic decisions occur in the United 
Kingdom, and only later are made formal by Board vote.   
 Thus I cannot agree with my colleagues that 15- to 30- 
minute meetings in Delaware—where two of the directors in 
effect drive by or attend by phone while the other director 
services myriad other holding companies in Delaware and 
tends to GSK Holdings for, at most, a few hours each year—
establish that Holdings‘ nerve center is in the state where 
those meetings are held.  This is especially so when Heslop 
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himself tells us that strategic decisions governing Holdings 
are made in the United Kingdom.   
 I worry that my colleagues‘ approach will encourage 
parties to shift the location or formal authority of their 
corporate boards in order to create citizenship where those 
board meetings are held.  My colleagues rightly state that 
courts have a responsibility to look past efforts at 
jurisdictional manipulation, but I think we likewise have a 
responsibility to avoid incentivizing manipulation that would 
require that inquiry.  A holding company should be treated 
like any other company under the Hertz test, looking for the 
―center of overall direction, control, and coordination‖ of the 
corporation, and ―not simply an office where the corporation 
holds its board meetings.‖  Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1192, 1194.    
 In light of this clear language, I believe the location of 
board of directors‘ meetings should only be deemed the nerve 
center of a corporation when evidence is absent that its actual 
guidance, supervision, and management—by its officers—
occurs elsewhere.  That absence is not the case here.  Officers 
of GSK Holdings in the United Kingdom make the calls later 
formalized by its board of directors in Delaware.  Under 
Hertz, its brain is thus located in the U.K.   
*     *     *     *     * 
 My colleagues have done a masterful job in addressing 
the parties‘ arguments that GSK Holdings‘ principal place of 
business is either in Pennsylvania or Delaware.  But the 
United Kingdom is also in play, and here critically so.  My 
colleagues‘ rationalization of sparse facts is, in effect, that 
holding companies are different than operating companies for 
the purpose of the nerve center test.  For them, this holds true 
until the Supreme Court tells us otherwise; for me the nerve 
center test applies uniformly to all companies until the 
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Supreme Court tells us otherwise.  For these reasons, I 
respectfully concur in the majority‘s judgment and in its 
opinion except for Part III.A.2.  
